Once considered a “nuclear option”, faculty votes of no-confidence against US college presidents have increased to the point that they are now regarded as a tactical weapon – and used ever more frequently.

Derived from parliamentary procedures used to remove heads of state, no-confidence votes are frequently described as being merely symbolic gestures that carry no legal authority. Yet they are not mere theatre. They have proven over the years to pack a punch, by virtue of being one of the most visible and potentially effective means for the faculty to register their belief that an institution’s leadership is failing to meet the moment. So much so that, more often than not, the targets of such votes decide to leave their posts within a year. The public rationales for their departures may not reference the vote, but its significant influence is usually unmistakable.

For our new book, , we analysed about 75 no-confidence votes spanning more than five decades, grouping them into eight categories based on the reasons cited by faculty for passing them. In reality, though, most no-confidence votes result not from a single episode or conflict but from a mixed stew of faculty disaffection with a president, often expressed in terms such as “failed leadership”, “poor communication”, “a toxic environment” or “low morale”. One senior faculty member who participated in a recent no-confidence vote at a major private university described it as arising from a “pick your grievance” menu of complaints.

Why are no-confidence votes on the rise? Our analysis suggests it is not primarily because of a change in the characteristics of the individuals who serve as presidents. Inexperienced presidents were no more likely to face faculty censure than veterans. Neither were there remarkable differences between the number of votes against men and women presidents, or white and non-white leaders.

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Rather, we argue that the surge in no-confidence votes reflects the intersection of two trends. First, has been a tendency for presidents to short-circuit the normal mechanisms of shared governance, by which administrators, faculty and a governing board have traditionally reached major campus decisions. That is particularly true on issues involving either a rapidly developing crisis like the pandemic or a serious financial shortfall leading to major budgetary or academic programme cutbacks.

Second, we note an increased willingness by formal institutional governance bodies such as university or faculty senates to weigh in on a host of contentious issues. The steady erosion of faculty tenure is another background factor. As the number of tenured or tenure-track staff decreases, disputes over budget cuts and academic restructuring are driven by fears that tenure will be further eroded.

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No-confidence votes are serious business that usually yield a range of consequences not only for their targets, but also for the institution – and for higher education in general. Our interviews, both with individuals who have been the subjects of such votes and with those who have led them, confirm that they leave an emotional wake for nearly everyone. They are personal, public and prolonged. Not only are they disruptive for the campus, they may also reinforce a growing scepticism about the value of college among the public at large.

No-confidence votes have a legitimate place in the academy. When college leaders abuse their authority, trample on academic freedom, deceive the campus, or repeatedly demonstrate poor judgement, a no-confidence vote can be an essential check on their behaviour, warning boards and the public that a serious leadership failure has taken place.

Still, no-confidence votes usually exact several costs, even when the grievances are well founded. They can harden factions, prevent compromise and make it more difficult to undertake necessary actions, such as balancing the budget, restructuring academic programmes, or establishing new priorities – precisely when a college or university cannot afford another failure.

No-confidence votes also have major implications for how governing boards set the agenda for a university and for how they interact with their presidents and faculty. That is because in some instances a president earns the condemnation of the faculty for enacting the priorities the board has established. When a president follows through on a board’s instruction to be “a change agent for the campus”, the risks of a no-confidence vote may increase.

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That is why several of our 10 recommendations for making votes of no confidence less common or necessary deal with the composition and functioning of governing boards. For example, we think that faculty should be voting members of boards; the objection that faculty will be too overwhelmed by self-interests to be good board members is, in our view, no longer convincing.

A second category of recommendations involves enhancing faculty and staff understanding of institutional budgeting and performance. Because so many no-confidence votes involve disagreements over financial priorities and academic restructuring, we believe that faculty and staff should actively participate in an institution’s formal budgeting process.

Third, we call for a recommitment to the effective practice of shared governance. Considerable deference should be paid to faculty senate opinions on major academic matters: a suggestion that flies into the stiff headwinds we see in several states that are attempting to legislate away the various powers that faculty senates have historically held.

Shared governance works well at most US colleges and universities, and no-confidence votes, although on the upswing, are still the exception, not the rule. Faculty and presidents are usually able to iron out their differences and keep their focus on high-quality teaching, influential research and effective community service. Collaboration, rather than conflict, typically prevails.

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But making sure that remains the case is vital if our colleges and universities are to remain capable of meeting the many challenges, both old and new, that are headed their way.

is faculty emeritus and a past president of Missouri State University. is a senior education consultant for the law firm of Husch Blackwell and was previously chancellor of Henderson State University and president of the University of Central Missouri. Their book, , is just released by Johns Hopkins University Press.

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